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Abstract
Within the field of information security, the
identification of what we are trying to secure is essential
to reducing risk. In private networks, this means
understanding the classification of host end-points,
identifying responsible users, and knowing the location
of hosts. For the context of this paper, the authors are
considering the challenges faced by higher education
institutions in implementing the first Center for Internet
Security (CIS) Critical Security Control: inventory of
authorized and unauthorized devices. The authors
developed and conducted a survey of chief information
security officers at these institutions. The survey
evaluated their confidence in meeting the goals of host
inventory tracking. The results of the survey, along with
analysis of the implications for information security
operations, are presented in this paper. Changes in
technology, such as BYOD, IoT, wireless, virtual
machines, and application containers, are contributing
to changes in the effectiveness of host inventory
controls.

1. Introduction
At the beginning of a normal workday, an analyst is
monitoring for incidents in a security operations center.
The analyst is enjoying a slow start so they are catching
up on emails from the previous day. Unfortunately, it
does not take long before they see an alert from one of
the institution’s intrusion detection systems. The analyst
is concerned because this alert is for a particularly
nefarious type of malware associated with theft of
personally identifiable information. As the analyst
creates a ticket to begin the response process, another
alert comes up. This time for a host identified with a
ransomware download. The analyst recognizes the IP
address as being in one of the administrative areas of the
institution. The analyst knows that if the ransomware
executes, it will begin encrypting the user’s local files
and any folders on a file server. Even if backups of the
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data are available, either incident could lead to data
exfiltration. Now the analyst must work fast to notify
responsible individuals quickly. If the tools available to
the analyst cannot provide an answer to who they should
contact, or the tools provide the incorrect person, more
time will be spent finding the responsible user while the
malware is in control and potentially doing harm.
In incident response, the time between initial
identification and containment is critical to reducing
damage particularly when sensitive or high-risk data is
involved [1]. This is particularly true with modern
malware moving to mobile devices and evolving to
include theft of messages, position data, and banking
credentials, all with real-time attacker command and
control [2].

2. CIS Critical Security Control one
Organizations must prioritize the application of
resources in the defense of cyber-attacks to minimize
risk to their networks. Cyber security controls
frameworks help with this prioritization, and often
recommend specific methods, software, and systems to
implement individual controls. Johnson states “all
security and corporate managers now need to be
concerned with compliance and governance of risks,
security, and the information usage in their systems” [3].
This is especially true for higher education institutions
that conduct research and must comply with mandates
to defend against cyber-attacks or risk losing funding.
CIS is a not-for-profit organization “dedicated to
enhancing the cyber security readiness and response
among public and private sector entities” [4]. The CIS
Critical Security Controls (CSC) for Effective Cyber
Defense exist as a framework to help organizations
improve their information security strategy. The
Controls were developed by experts from many
different organizations who “pooled their extensive
first-hand knowledge from defending against actual
cyber-attacks to evolve the consensus list of Controls,
representing the best defensive techniques to prevent or
track them” [5]. The twenty Controls are “a prioritized,
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highly focused set of actions that have a community
support network to make them implementable, usable,
scalable, and compliant with all industry or government
security requirements” [5]. The CSC framework is
intended to provide an organization with key areas
where they should specifically focus their efforts. Each
Control gives example technologies that an organization
can implement to help achieve their goal of reducing
risk. As no single measure is guaranteed to prevent
cyber security incidents, organizations are encouraged
to implement all the Controls to have a defense in depth
strategy.
In this paper we focus on the first Control outlined
in the CSC: inventory of authorized and unauthorized
devices. As of version 6.1 of the CSC, six sub controls
are defined for the first Control.
CSC 1.1, “deploy an automated asset inventory
discovery tool…” [5] is common for Internet Protocol
version 4 (IPv4) networks. Organizations can scan their
network address space to identify hosts, and even
attempt operating system identification. Nmap and
other tools can provide this ability [6]. Unfortunately,
scanning an Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) network
is not so straightforward, due to the extremely large
address space and time it would take to iterate through
each to send probe packets to solicit a response [7]. In
more recent years, passive scanning, or the listening for
active hosts on the network, has become more common.
This involves “the process of monitoring network traffic
at the packet layer to determine topology, services, and
vulnerabilities” [8].
CSC 1.2, “deploy dynamic host configuration
protocol (DHCP) server logging...” [5] is something that
most organizations can easily implement. By simply
logging DHCP server events, we can better track hosts
on the network. This is commonly used in IPv4
networks; however, depending on the IPv6 deployment,
DHCP may or may not be used. IPv6 networks may use
Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC),
DHCPv6, or statically assigned addresses [9], [10].
CSC 1.3, “ensure that all equipment acquisitions
automatically update the inventory...” [5] is
fundamentally a business process. To comply,
organizations must make sure there are automatic
updates to the inventory based on new acquisitions. This
can be accomplished by integrating an Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP) application with the inventory
system. Doing these updates manually becomes
problematic for many organizations, requiring data
entry in the business and financial applications that is
IT-specific. In some organizations there is a
fundamental decoupling of business operations from
network operations.
CSC 1.4, “maintain an asset inventory of all systems
connected to the network…” [5] describes an all-

encompassing inventory. This Control seems to be
solved by using a database-driven application to track
this information. This is common, as are spreadsheets,
in many organizations. However, the accuracy of these
manual processes usually erodes over time, given the
significant effort required by personnel to enter and
update each host’s details. This technique also does not
scale for networks with tens or hundreds of thousands of
hosts. Something that is common to research institution
networks is the ability to Bring Your Own Device
(BYOD) and connect it to the network. While many
corporate networks are able to resist BYOD, higher
education has seen this for decades. This means that
CSC 1.3 is not applicable in this situation since the
owner of the device is not the same as the owner of the
network.
CSC 1.5, “deploy network level authentication via
802.1x…” [5] requires every host to be authenticated to
the network. This is commonly deployed for wireless
and some wired networks. Sometimes it is also deployed
to authenticate Voice over IP (VoIP) devices to separate
Virtual Local Area Networks (VLAN). Depending on
the end points, this may be less feasible to deploy across
the entire network of an organization. There may also be
limitations on the deployment of 802.1x with older
networking equipment.
Finally, CSC 1.6, “use client certificates…” [5]
requires the use of certificates to authenticate each
device instead of a username and password. Client
certificates are a highly secure method of authentication
but do carry significant management overhead.

3. Survey design
Our higher education CISO survey was designed to
answer the following high-level questions: Are new
technologies changing the accuracy of inventory
controls? How quickly can the location of a host and the
responsible user be identified? Are current host
inventory controls effective? Have there been changes
in effectiveness due to increases in Internet of Things
(IoT) and BYOD hosts? Do the responses vary with
subsets of the population such as size of the network or
number of employees dedicated to information security
operations?
The survey was also intended to look for correlations
between sizes or types of institutions and network
architectures. Network architectures will vary with the
type of institution to include the amount of research,
number of residential students, and user population size.
Some of the questions were based on similar surveys
that identified current challenges in information security
for higher education institutions [11].
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The survey was reviewed by several information
technology professionals for the quality of questions and
answers. Many questions were modified or removed to
reduce ambiguity and improve readability. The survey
was tested prior to release and the respondents’ test
results were also used to improve the questions.
No personal information of the respondents was
solicited. The only identifying attribute recorded was
the respondent’s IP address. This was used to identify
whether multiple responses were recorded for the same
institution. This also gave the ability to delete a response
at the request of a respondent by asking them to verify
the IP address they used. Even with this single piece of
information that could be linked to the institution, it will
be removed once the survey is closed. This is to
encourage honest responses without fear of the
respondent being identified.
The target population for the survey is all higher
education institutions in the United States. According to
the Carnegie Classification, there are approximately
4,600 institutions [12]. The first question of the survey
was to identify the respondent’s institution’s Basic
Carnegie Classification. Additionally, questions were
asked to determine the size and attributes of each
institution to include numbers of students, employees,
employees in information security roles, and estimated
research expenditures. This first section of the survey
was used to provide a framework for comparison of like
institutions only. The second, third, and fourth sections
of the survey asked questions pertinent to network size,
host identification, and evaluation of controls. Samples
of those survey questions are mapped to the appropriate
CSC control in Table 1.
Table 1: Select questions mapped to the CSC
Survey Question
2.1. What is your best estimate for the peak
number of hosts on your network at one time?
2.2. What is the average number of BYOD
hosts each type of end-user connects to your
network?
2.4. What is your best estimate for the number
of sub-networks (Local Area Network
segments or broadcast domains)?
2.10. Where does your institution allow
embedded hosts or Internet of Things (IoT) on
your network?
3.1. What is the estimated percentage of each
type of host on your network?
3.3. What IP addressing methods do you use?

CSC
1.2,
1.4,
1.5
1.3,
1.4
1.1,
1.4
1.3,
1.4
1.3,
1.4
1.1,
1.4

3.7. How confident are you in your
organization’s ability to identify hosts with
multiple, changing addresses, to include
application containers (Docker) and IPv6
privacy extensions (RFC 4941)?
3.8. What percentage of hosts on your network
utilize some form of network authentication to
connect (IEEE 802.1x, NAC, etc.)?
4.1. For the purposes of your host inventory
controls, what types of hosts do you track?
4.2. During a potential security incident or
event, how long does it usually take to track
down the responsible user or owner of these
host types?
4.6. How accurate have you found the
following tools and technologies to be in
keeping track of hosts in your network?
4.7. Do you consider embedded devices or IoT
hosts more difficult to track than other hosts?

1.1,
1.4

1.5,
1.6
1.3,
1.4
1.4,
1.5

1.4,
1.5
1.4

The survey had 42 questions but some asked the
respondent to answer for different cases which results in
up to 96 total data points. Only one question had a
required response due to validation needed to constrain
the sum of the response to one hundred percent.

4. Results
The survey was opened for distribution to
participants on May 24, 2017. Since the survey was
targeting Chief Information Security Officers of higher
education, several email lists were used to distribute the
anonymous link. Most respondents completed the
survey in less than 20 minutes.

4.1. Institution classification
These survey results cover 51 responses. More than
half of the respondents reported their institutions to be
R1, R2, or R3 doctoral granting universities with
research activity as shown in Figure 1.
Baccalaureate
13%

Special Focus 4-Year
2%

Associate's
11%

R1
40%

M2
5%
M1
18%

R3
9%

R2
2%

Figure 1: Percentage of respondent
institutions by Basic Carnegie Classification
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7 to 10
BYOD Hosts

Using the high-end of the selected ranges for total
employees, employees in IT, and employees in security
operations, ratios were calculated. The results showed
the ratios of employees to be 5.3 percent for IT to total
employees and 5.4 percent for information security to IT
employees.
There was a wide variety of reported enrolled
students with most reporting between 2,000 and 50,000.
There was some variance with the number of reported
remote students. However, more than half of the
respondents reported 10 percent or fewer remote
students.

4 to 6
2 to 3
≤1
0

10

Table 2: CISO's ability to deny or allow hosts
Response Option
%
1 The CIO or CISO has the ability to deny or
64
allow all hosts on the network
2 The CIO or CISO has the ability to deny or
26
allow most hosts but not all
3 The network is mostly federated. Most
organizational units control their networking, 2
to include network equipment and hosts
4 The network is completely federated. The
CIO or CISO has no ability to allow or
0
disallow hosts.
5 Other
7
This question may have been interpreted differently
than anticipated. The intent was to determine how
federated or completely centralized the institution’s IT
functions were. If the respondents understood the
question, it is possible that their institutions are mostly
centralized in terms of managing the network.
Figure 2 shows the responses to question 2.2, BYOD
host percentages by user type. The differences are
particularly pronounced for residential students in the 4
to 6 range.

30

40

Employees
Non-residential students
Residential students

4.2. Network characteristics
For question 2.1, most of the respondents selected
the peak hosts on their network to be 10,000 to 50,000.
Eleven respondents said their networks were greater
than 50,000. One stated they had more than 500,000
peak hosts on their network.
One important question asked, “How is the
respondent’s network managed?” The results are shown
in Table 2.

20

Number of Respondents

Figure 2: BYOD host quantity by user type
For the average number of BYOD hosts connected
by non-residential students, 67 percent of respondents
said 2 to 3. This differs from the number of BYOD hosts
connected by residential students, which was split
between 2 to 3 and 4 to 6. This is not surprising, as you
can assume that residential students will connect devices
in their dorm rooms that they would otherwise keep in
an off-campus residence. What we found surprising is
that 73 percent of respondents said employees
connected 2 to 3 BYOD hosts. This means that most
institutions expect employees to connect 2 to 3 personal,
BYOD devices that are not institutionally owned.
Questions 2.9 and 2.10 in the survey asked where the
institution allowed BYOD and embedded or IoT hosts.
The results in Figure 3 show that most respondents
chose “most logical network zones” for BYOD hosts.
Only one logical
network zones
A few logical
network zones
Most logical
network zones

All logical
network zones
0

5

10

15

20

Number of Respondents

Where do you allow embedded or IoT hosts
Where do you allow BYOD hosts

Figure 3: Where BYOD, embedded, and IoT
hosts are allowed
For embedded or IoT hosts, the response was evenly
distributed. The exception to both is that a few
institutions allow BYOD and embedded or IoT hosts on
all network zones.
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for virtual machines and application containers. The
results are shown in Figure 5.

4.3. Defining a host
The authors were interested in understanding what
the average distribution of host types are on an
institution’s network. Question 3.1 asked respondents to
provide their estimated percentage of each of four host
categories: embedded devices, servers, institutionally
owned end-user devices, and BYOD end-user devices.
The results in Table 3 show that, on average, embedded
devices (IoT, printers, cameras) and BYOD end-user
devices make up half of an institutions network.

Extremely unconfident
Somewhat unconfident
Neither confident…
Somewhat confident
Extremely confident
0

10

Application Containers

Table 3: Host type percentages
Host Type
Embedded devices (IoT,
printers, cameras, etc.)
Servers with full
operating systems
(either physical or
virtual)
Institution owned enduser devices (desktops,
laptops, mobile devices)
BYOD end-user devices
(desktops, laptops,
mobile devices)
Other

Min Max Mean
%
%

Std
Dev

1

25

9.11

6.03

1

80

15.89

14.3
9

4

75

33.56

16.2
8

0

92

39.44

20.6
4

0

11

0.86

2.57

Static IPv4
DHCP (IPv4)
DHCPv6
SLAAC (IPv6)
Static IPv6
10

Virtual Machines

Figure 5: Confidence in identifying virtual
machines and application containers
The last question of this section asked how
respondents identified a unique host. Most all stated, in
their own words, that a MAC address was the unique
identifier.

4.4. Evaluation of inventory controls

When asked about the percentage of hosts that use
statically assigned IP addresses, all but one respondent
said 10 or 20 percent. In addition, the respondents were
asked what addressing methods they used. The results
are shown in Figure 4.

0

20

Number of Respondents

20

30

40

Number of Respondents
Wired connections
Wireless connections

Figure 4: Types of addressing used on wired
and wireless connections

In this section of the survey, the first question asked
respondents to identify whether or not a particular host
type was tracked. The results are shown in Figure 6.
Physical servers w/
full operating system
Virtual servers w/
full operating system
Embedded devices / IoT
Printers / copiers
Video Cameras
VoIP phones
Application containers
(Docker)
Institution owned wired
Ethernet end-user devices
Institution owned
wireless hosts
Institution owned
network equipment
BYOD wired Ethernet
hosts
BYOD wireless hosts
BYOD network
equipment
0

Interestingly, eight respondents stated that they used
static IPv4 addressing on wireless connections. These
could be embedded devices such as printers or copies
using wireless however, the authors would expect
DHCP Reservations to be used for wireless devices
Questions 3.6 and 3.7 asked how confident the
respondent was in identifying unique individual hosts

10

20

30

40

Number of Respondents
Tracked

Not tracked but allowed

Not allowed

Figure 6: Host tracking by type
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Can't be
found

Time in Minutes

It is worth noting that fewer respondents said BYOD,
embedded or IoT, and application containers were
tracked. Most respondents tracked physical and virtual
servers, VoIP phones, video cameras, printers, and
institutionally owned network equipment.
Figure 7 shows the time it takes to track down the
physical location of a host for non-research institutions.
It is worth noting that a greater number of research
institutions (R1, R2, and R3) selected the more than 60
minutes option for multiple host types as shown in
Figure 8. This could be due to the larger number of hosts
on research institution networks or the distribution of IT
responsibility.

> 60
31 to 60
11 to 30
2 to 10
≤1
0

2

4

6

8

Number of Respondents

Time in Minutes

Can't be
found

A wireless end-user host

> 60

A wired end-user host
Virtual machines and application containers

31 to 60

A wired Ethernet server with full operating
system
A wireless embedded device, including printers,
cameras, and IoT
A wired embedded device, including printers,
cameras, and IoT

11 to 30
2 to 10
≤1

0

5

10

Number of Respondents

Figure 8: Time to find physical location of
different host types for research institutions

A wireless end-user host
A wired end-user host

Virtual machines and application containers
A wired Ethernet server with full operating
system
A wireless embedded device, including printers,
cameras, and IoT
A wired embedded device, including printers,
cameras, and IoT

Figure 7: Time to find physical location of
different host types for non-research
institutions
For question 4.4, respondents were asked how often
their inventory controls and tools lead to someone who
is not the current responsible user and most respondents
selected a few times a month. Some wrote in that it
varies widely and that it is worse for lab environments.
Question 4.6 asked respondents how accurate they
thought various inventory tools were. The results are
show in Figure 9.

Spreadsheets
Commercial inventory
applications
Custom / in-house
inventory applications
MAC address
registration
Software agents
on hosts
802.1x
Mobile device
management
Network device
logs
Network flow
data
Mapping or
scanning (IPv4)
Mapping or
scanning (IPv6)
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Number of Respondents

Not very Accurate
Very Accurate

Somewhat accurate
Not used

Figure 9: Accuracy of inventory tools
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It is worth noting that five respondents said that
mapping or scanning of IPv6 was somewhat or very
accurate. It would be interesting to know their methods
given the large address space.
Questions 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 asked if certain host types
were more difficult to track than others as shown in
Figure 10.
IoT

Question 4.13 asked respondents how much time
they spend updating host inventory control tools. The
results, charted in Figure 12, show that more than half
of institutions spend a moderate to significant amount of
time updating records.
None - our inventory
tools are highly automated
Minimal - each host is
setup once and rarely needs
human interaction to update

BYOD

Moderate - some human
interaction is needed to
keep host records accurate

NAT/PAT
0

10

20

30

Number of Respondents

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

Yes - more difficult
About the same as other hosts
Less difficult to track than other hosts
Not applicable

Number of Respondents

Figure 10: Difficulty tracking host types
The third host type, NAT/PAT, was used to determine
whether address translation has an impact on inventory
controls. Interestingly, seven respondents selected not
applicable for NAT/PAT. The authors surmise that these
institutions may have enough IPv4 addresses for all
hosts, and therefore have no need for address
translation.
Questions 4.11 and 4.12 asked if respondents believe
the effectiveness of their host inventory controls
changed in the past five years for either BYOD and IoT
hosts. As shown in Figure 11, nearly half of the
respondents from research institutions stated that both
host types impacted the effectiveness of their inventory
controls.
The impact has
noticeably decreased
the effectiveness
Not noticeable from
overall host growth
It has made inventory
controls more effective
Not applicable

0

5

10

Number of Respondents
IoT

Significant - many host
records need to be updated
frequently

BYOD

Figure 11: Effectiveness of host inventory
controls from impact of IoT and BYOD for
research institutions

Figure 12: Time spent updating inventory
tools
The final question of the survey asked if the
respondent had any specific challenges with host
inventory controls. A couple of respondents stated that
it is difficult to have a unified inventory with a
distributed IT responsibility. One respondent also stated
that NAT/PAT can be an issue for their DMCA
complaints. Another stated that they would like to raise
awareness of keeping inventories current and correct.

5. Discussion and insights
It is worth noting that even though the CSC 1
provides methods for inventory, these are corporate
enterprise-centric. Even though a higher education
institution network may be a special case, the way it
works may actually become more common. With
BYOD, wireless, and virtualization, the methods of
traditional inventory are becoming more difficult to
deploy and scale. Specifically with BYOD, corporate
networks are allowing more personal devices in their
environments [13]. Some will segment their wireless
networks; however, there is ever growing pressure for
these corporate networks to allow personal devices on
their more restrictive network segments.

5.1. Network access
We must consider the user-base as we discuss access
and authenticating to a network. In a higher education
institution’s network, there is an expectation that access
to the Internet should be unhindered. This is because
faculty and students need to complete their work by
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collaborating with other higher education institutions
and industry partners. To them, the network is only a
tool to accomplish this. Additionally, many research
institutions have multiple campuses along with faculty
and students who are frequently traveling around the
world. With this culture, there is usually greater
emphasis on controlling access at the applications that
are globally available.
This leads to the discussion of private versus public
networks. Many higher education institutions operate
networks, which could be considered hybrids. For legal
reasons, most institutions consider themselves private
networks, but discussions have been ongoing ever since
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act (CALEA) and the USA PATRIOT Act have come
into existence [14]. Even with this designation, most
faculty and students expect open access to the Internet.
This is a culture that has been around since the early
years of the Internet. Larger higher education networks
are traditionally operated like Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) where their primary focus is to make sure packets
are getting from one host to another. In recent years,
some higher education institutions have become more
limiting on the free flow of traffic in and out of their
networks. Nonetheless, these networks remain much
more open than other private networks such as those in
corporate environments. This cultural tendency makes
requiring high assurance authentication to the network,
and ultimately the Internet, a challenge.

5.2. Host attributes
In previous decades, a host might have used the same
IPv4 address for long periods of time, sometimes
months or even years. The pace at which IT systems are
changing is increasing. The life cycle of an individual
host has shortened while the expectations of service
availability has increased. This leads to redundancy
inside a host’s subsystems and to redundancy in entire
hosts. With redundancy at the host level, the service may
change which hosts are responding to requests. This
leads to hosts that are dynamic and taken out of service
for maintenance or failure. Virtualization furthers this
trend of more difficulty in tracking hosts. Virtualization
enables the decoupling hosts from hardware, thereby
allowing movement. The Media Access Control (MAC)
addresses, previously considered relatively static, are
now created when new virtual machines (VM) are
defined [15]. The ease of creating and moving VMs can
be a challenge for traditional host inventory tools.
Some environments are moving to services being
deployed in containers by which the operating system or
host is considered separate. This leads to even more
churn in the traditionally static hosts providing services.
For example, Docker is a containerization platform that

provides separation of applications from their operating
system. Using Linux kernel technology, the containers
even have their own network interfaces [16]. These
interfaces, like the virtual machines, have their own
MAC addresses. Again, this can complicate the issue of
how we define a host and what attributes we inventory.

5.3. Host responsibility and organizational
inefficiencies
Answering the question of who is responsible is core
to host inventory. This can be a difficult problem in a
federated research institution network. There can be
hosts in which the user is the responsible party, as is the
case for BYOD. There are also groups of hosts in which
an IT professional is responsible. In some instances the
research institution can have both a central IT
organization and distributed IT professionals reporting
through different leadership. This federated network
management model requires more effort to define and
track who is responsible for any host. One common
method involves the assignment of blocks of addresses
to organizational units. The institution assumes that
organizational units will track hosts within their
assigned block. It is an honor system and can be
problematic if the organizational unit has no knowledge
of a host using one of its addresses.
Two of the sub controls from CSC 1 are focused on
authenticating to the network. If we accept the scenario
in which all devices on a network are authenticated, we
still have to map the user to a group or responsible IT
professional. Again, BYOD comes into play whereby
the organization may not have a record of who the
device belongs to or who should be contacted if there is
an incident involving it.
One last consideration is the time involved in
maintaining most host inventories. It is simple to keep
the inventory of a twenty-host network up to date. The
time it takes to maintain the inventory increases steadily
with the number of hosts unless efficient tools are used.
Even then, there is significant time spent on updating
each host entry. This can be a burden on already busy IT
personnel and takes them away from solving more high
profile issues. IT professionals can also miscategorize
or mistype information. This fundamentally human
element makes a tedious tracking process more
inaccurate as time goes on.

6. Future work
The number of security incidents occurring within
many networks is increasing. The time to detection is
not keeping up with the time to compromise as
described in the Verizon 2016 Data Breach
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Investigations Report [17]. This means that we must get
better at reducing time to detection and ultimately
remediation. By improving a network’s host inventory,
we can reduce the time to remediation. This is
accomplished by quickly determining where a host is
and who is responsible.
An accurate host inventory is also a place of record
for answering other questions. These include which
hosts may need operating system updates and which
hosts may be vulnerable to newly announced exploits.
This valuable tool goes beyond information security to
include understanding how hosts change over time.
If we can leverage automated data flows to populate
a host inventory, we can also extend it to become more
about crowdsourcing IT security. Presenting users with
options and information pertinent to their hosts, we can
enable them to make decisions rather than those
personnel at the organization level. In time sensitive
incidents, this can reduce risk of data exposure by
getting the people who know the host the best looking
at the problem. This also enables organizational IT
security personnel to focus on wide trends and hunt for
vulnerabilities. This encourages the philosophy that
those closest to the hosts know most about them and
security is local.
Much of the information needed to create a dynamic,
host inventory with minimal human intervention is
already available. The information is in the form of log
events which are often left on servers or sent to closed

systems for human review. This information should be
consolidated and used for more than just ad hoc queries.
Correlation of user authentication with host activity has
been implemented in higher education institution
networks in the form of the Grand Unified Logging
Program (GULP) [18]. This system, developed at
Columbia University, demonstrates that it is possible to
maintain open access to a network and identify
responsible users without preregistration or network
authentication.
The authors have begun designing a solution that
uses network device generated data, such as MAC
address to IP address mappings and user authentications
to applications, as shown in Figure 13. This design
builds on existing solutions and utilizes near real-time
data flows.
Now that data analytics has become more the norm,
and compute cycles and memory are inexpensive, we
can use these resources to mine relevant log events for
the right information [19]. Given the right logic, we can
piece together what a host is and how it is interacting
with the network. This enables us to remove most of the
human data entry from the host inventory. It also allows
for more timely updates to the inventory and is therefore
more accurate at any point in time. This will help solve
the problem, identified in question 4.13 of the survey,
that most institutions spend at least a moderate amount
of time updating host records. It will also reduce the
time necessary to identify physical locations of hosts

Figure 13: Diagram of a data-driven host inventory system
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that is shown in Figure 7 and 8. Lastly, this approach
should improve confidence in the ability to track more
host types.
The authors are also taking into consideration that
any current inventory system needs to accommodate a
hundred-thousand hosts or more in a given day with
many moving around the network. This can be
accomplished using modern, scalable technologies such
as clustered message queues, flexible parsing engines,
and distributed data stores.

7. Conclusion
More work needs to be done to address the needs of
host inventory in higher education, and specifically,
research institution networks. The Critical Security
Control One provides a high-level goal that every
network should strive to achieve. However, the
recommended technologies for implementing the
control can be difficult for some institutions.
Therefore, a data-driven host inventory system is
needed to address the dynamic nature and growth of
connected end-user devices. In addition, new classes of
hosts, such as IoT, virtual machines, and application
containers, are contributing to decreased effectiveness
in higher education institutions’ abilities to track
locations and responsible users. Using real-time log
analytics, a data-driven host inventory system can help
reverse this trend.
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